

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 /089 W

----- 053081

R 160815Z JUN 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1030

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 0159

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0273

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL AND DISTO

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: SUMMARY REPORT FOR PERIOD JUNE 9-15, 1975

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS THIS WEEK, THE EAST KEPT UP THEIR TACTICAL OFFENSIVE ON THE ALLIED TWO-PHASE APPROACH, CHARGING THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITH SEEKING TO AVOID SPECIFIC, INDIVIDUAL PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS. IN THE JUNE 10 INFORMAL

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SESSION, ALLIED REPS REPLIED THAT THE NATURE OF PHASE II

REDUCTION COMMITMENTS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN PHASE II, BUT THAT THE WEST WOULD IN ANY EVENT CONSIDER ONLY THOSE OBLIGATIONS WHICH WERE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING ENVISAGED BY THE WEST. SOVIET REP KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT SPECIFIC REDUCTION COMMITMENTS WERE NOT NECESSARILY LINKED TO NATIONAL CEILINGS. HE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS CONCEPTUALLY POSSIBLE TO HAVE SPECIFIC REDUCTION COMMITMENTS AND A COLLECTIVE CEILING. GDR REPS MADE PLAIN, HOWEVER, THE CONTINUED EASTERN INSISTENCE ON NATIONAL CEILINGS. END SUMMARY.

2. FOLLOWING UP ON THE JUNE 3 INFORMAL SESSION, THE EAST RETURNED AT THE JUNE 10 INFORMAL TO THE SUBJECT OF PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS. THE EAST ONCE AGAIN INSISTED THAT EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT MUST UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC, INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS. EASTERN REPS ASKED WHETHER, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ALLIED REDUCTION PROGRAM, EACH OF THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD COMMIT ITSELF INDIVIDUALLY IN PHASE II AS TO THE AMOUNT OF ITS REDUCTIONS.

3. ALLIED REPS REPLIED BY NOTING THAT ALL THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAVE OFFERED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES, IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT, TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING IN PHASE II. THEY HAVE ALSO GIVEN AN ILLUSTRATIVE 700,000 MAN FIGURE FOR THE COMMON CEILING, AND HAVE PROVIDED DATA ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS; THEREFORE, THE EAST ALSO KNOWS THE OVERALL DIMENSIONS OF THE TOTAL WESTERN REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, IT WAS PREMATURE NOW TO GO INTO THE PRECISE DETAILS OF THE NATURE OF PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS. ALLIED REPS CONCLUDED THAT THE WEST WOULD, IN ANY EVENT, BE PREPARED IN PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS TO CONSIDER ONLY THOSE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS WHICH ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING ENVISAGED BY THE WEST.

4. EASTERN REPS ARGUED STRONGLY THAT THIS APPROACH
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WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. THEY ALLEGED THAT THESE WESTERN STATEMENTS MEANT THAT, EVEN IN PHASE II, THE FRG AND THE OTHER NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION COMMITMENTS. WHEN ALLIED REPS AGAIN INSISTED THAT PHASE II REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS MUST BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH A COLLECTIVE CEILING, THE SOVIET REP KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT IT WAS THEORETICALLY AND PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE TO HAVE

SPECIFIC REDUCTION COMMITMENTS AND EITHER A COLLECTIVE CEILING OR NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS. HOWEVER, BOTH IN THE INFORMAL SESSION AND IN A SUBSEQUENT BILATERAL TALK WITH A US DELOFF, GDR REPS HAVE STRESSED THE CONTINUED EASTERN INSISTENCE ON NATIONAL CEILINGS.

5. THE AD HOC GROUP HAD A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THE PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENT PROBLEM JUNE 12 AND PROVISIONALLY APPROVED A REPORT TO NAC (SEPTTEL). AT THE AHG MEETING, AND IN BILATERAL TALKS, FRG REP MADE CLEAR THAT BONN TAKES A VERY CAUTIOUS VIEW OF THE PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENT QUESTION AND CONSIDERS IT PREMATURE AT THIS TIME TO DISCUSS WITH THE EAST THE NATURE OF PHASE II REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS. THE FRG REP AND OTHER ALLIED REPS HAVE TOLD US THAT BONN SEES THE PHASE II REDUCTION OBLIGATION ISSUE AS A POSSIBLE SLIPPERY SLOPE TO NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS. FRG REP ALSO HAS INDICATED THAT CURRENT EASTERN FRUSTRATION IN THE FACE OF ALLEGED ALLIED "BACKTRACKING" MIGHT BE PRODUCTIVE FOR THE WEST. FRG REP CLAIMED THAT HIS TACTICS ALREADY HAD LED SOVIET REP KHLESTOV, FOR THE FIRST TIME, TO INDICATE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN REDUCTIONS COMMITMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING RESIDUAL CEILINGS, AND TO TREAT THE TWO ISSUES SEPARATELY.

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

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R 160815Z JUN 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1031

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 0160

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0273

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL AND DISTO

FROM US REP MBFR

6. THE WEST WILL HAVE TO CLARIFY ITS
POSITION ON PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS,
IN SOME REASONABLE MANNER, IF THE ALLIES ARE TO
STAND ANY CHANCE OF EVENTUALLY GAINING
EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN PHASING
CONCEPT, AND THE AHG IS PREPARING
A REPORT TO NAC ON THE ISSUE. HOWEVER, GIVEN
THE PRESENTLY RIGID FRG POSITION, THE AHG
REPORT TO NAC ON THE REDUCTION COMMITMENT
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ISSUE WILL NECESSARILY BE A COMPROMISE DOCUMENT.

7. WESTERN REPS ALSO USED THE JUNE 10 INFORMAL TO URGE THE EAST
ONCE AGAIN TO ENGAGE IN A DATA EXCHANGE PARALLEL WITH A DISCUSSION
OF OTHER ISSUES. KHLESTOV UNQUALIFIEDLY REJECTED A DATA EXCHANGE
AT THIS TIME, AND AGAIN SAID THAT DATA EXCHANGE WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT
RESOLUTION OF SUCH QUESTIONS AS WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM
THE OUTSET AND WHAT TYPE OF FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED. IN A
BILATERAL DISCUSSION, GDR DEPREP TOOK THE STANDARD
EASTERN LINE ON DATA, BUT ALSO POSED THE "HYPOTHETICAL
QUESTION" WHETHER THE WEST WOULD BRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND OTHER ARMAMENTS INTO REDUCTIONS IF THE EAST SIMPLY
WERE TO AGREE TO THE GROUND FORCE FIGURES ALREADY PRESENTED
BY THE WEST. IN THE INFORMAL, POLISH REP STRULAK AGAIN
PRESENTED THE EASTERN ARGUMENT THAT THE WESTERN REDUCTION
APPROACH WOULD PERMIT AN ARMS RACE IN THE AREA. HE
ASSERTED THAT THE WEST WAS SUGGESTING EXCHANGE OF ONLY
THAT DATA WHICH SUPPORTED THE WEST'S OWN REDUCTION PROGRAM.
IN SUPPORT OF THIS ARGUMENT, STRUALK SAID THE WEST HAD
REFRAINED FROM SUGGESTING DATA EXCHANGE ON ARMAMENTS
OUTSIDE ITS PROGRAM SUCH AS TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
AIRCRAFT.

8. IN THE JUNE 12 PLENARY MEETING, NETHERLANDS REP

DE VOS PRESENTED A DETAILED CASE FOR THE WESTERN PROPOSAL THAT SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I TAKE THE FORM OF THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY, INCLUDING FIVE DIVISIONS AND SOME 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 1700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS. IN JUSTIFYING THE WESTERN DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY, DE VOS REFERRED TO ALLIED CONCERNS REGARDING THE LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET TANKS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL CONCENTRATION, THEIR FORWARD POSITION AND THE OVERALL MASSIVE PREPONDERANCE OF EASTERN TANKS OVER WESTERN TANKS IN THE AREA. RESOR

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